This paper argues that the global poverty problem has changed because most of the world's poor no longer live in poor countries meaning low-income countries (LICs). In the past poverty has been viewed as an LIC issue predominantly, nowadays such simplistic assumptions/classifications can be misleading because a number of the large countries that have graduated into the MIC category still have large number of poor people. In 1990, we estimate that 93 per cent of the world's poor people lived in LICs. In contrast, in 2007 8 we estimate that three-quarters of the world's approximately 1.3bn poor people now live in middle-income countries (MICs) and only about a quarter of the world's poor -about 370mn people live in the remaining 39 low-income countries, which are largely in sub-Saharan Africa. This is then a startling change over two decades. It implies there is a new 'bottom billion' who do not live in fragile and conflict-affected states but largely in stable, middle-income countries. Further, such global patterns are evident across monetary, nutritional, and multi-dimensional poverty measures. In reaching this conclusion, the paper: discusses the origin and current definitions of the low/middle/upper income classification; relates these classifications to International Development Association (IDA) eligibility/allocation thresholds; summarises the definition of 'fragile and conflict-affected states' (FCAS); makes preliminary estimates for 2007 8 and the number of poor people in each income and fragility category; makes an approximate estimation of the changes in these numbers over the last 20 years; and compares the global distribution of the poor by measures of monetary, educational, nutritional and multi-dimensional poverty.
This is then a startling change over two decades. It implies there is a new 'bottom billion' who do not live in fragile and conflict-affected states but largely in stable, middle-income countries. Further, such global patterns are evident across monetary, nutritional, and multi-dimensional poverty measures. In reaching this conclusion, the paper: discusses the origin and current definitions of the low/middle/upper income classification; relates these classifications to International Development Association (IDA) eligibility/allocation thresholds; summarises the definition of 'fragile and conflict-affected states' (FCAS); makes preliminary estimates for 2007 8 and the number of poor people in each income and fragility category; makes an approximate estimation of the changes in these numbers over the last 20 years; and compares the global distribution of the poor by measures of monetary, educational, nutritional and multi-dimensional poverty.
It is recognised that the endeavour of this paper is an inherently imprecise exercise but it is argued that the general pattern is robust enough to warrant further investigation and discussion. Indeed, the results raise all sorts of questions about the definitions of country categories in themselves. They also raise numerous questions about the future of poverty reduction in heterogeneous contexts, about the role of inequality, about structural societal change and about aid and development policy. One read of the data is that poverty is increasingly turning from an international to a national distribution problem, and that governance and domestic taxation and redistribution policies become of more importance than overseas development assistance (ODA).
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
If development is about poverty reduction, where the poor live is a crucial question. This paper seeks to add to the existing analysis of global poverty estimates by region by estimating the global distribution of the world's poor by low-income country (LIC) and middle-income country (MIC) classification and by fragile and conflict-affected states (FCAS).
It is recognised that the endeavour of this paper is an inherently imprecise exercise but it is argued that the general pattern generated is robust enough to warrant further investigation and discussion.
In the past poverty has been viewed as an LIC issue predominantly, nowadays such simplistic assumptions/classifications can be misleading because a number of the large countries that have graduated into the MIC category still have large number of poor people.
The analysis presented can be summed up in three points as follows.
First, there's a new 'bottom billion' living in the MICs: three-quarters of the world's poor -or almost one billion poor people -now live in MICs. Indeed, about two-thirds of the world's poor live in stable MICs. This isn't just about India and China as the percentage of global poverty accounted for by the MICs minus China and India has risen considerably from 7 per cent to 22 per cent. The findings are consistent across monetary, nutritional and multi-dimensional poverty measures.
Second, the remaining 39 LICs account for just a quarter of the world's poor, and fragile LICs account for just 12 per cent of the world's poor.
Third, contrary to earlier estimates that a third of the poor live in fragile states, our estimate is about 23 per cent if one takes the broadest definition of FCAS (43 countries), and they are split fairly evenly between fragile LICs and fragile MICs.
Of course there are caveats to the above on methodological grounds. We note here just four countries (India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Nigeria) account for much of the total number of poor that have 'moved' to MIC countries. More importantly, is the above an artefact of methodology in itself? How meaningful are country classifications? The headlines do though raise questions not only about the definitions of country categories; but also about the future of poverty reduction in heterogeneous contexts; about the role of inequality and structural societal change; and about aid and development policy. One read of the data is that poverty is increasingly turning from an international to a national distribution problem, and that governance and domestic taxation and redistribution policies become of more importance than ODA. 
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It is recognised that the endeavour of this paper is an inherently imprecise exercise but it is argued that the general pattern generated is robust enough to warrant further investigation and discussion. Indeed, the results raise all sorts of questions about the definitions of country categories, about the future of poverty reduction in heterogeneous contexts, the role of inequality and structural societal change, and about aid and development policy. The full set of poverty estimates for 2007-8 by monetary, nutritional, educational and multi-dimensional poverty measures are annexed to this paper (and the Excel charts for both 1988-90 and 2007-8 are available from the author on request).
EXISTING ESTIMATES OF GLOBAL POVERTY
The World Bank's most recent systematic estimate of global poverty is that by Chen and Ravallion (2008) . They updated the international poverty line (based on the average of a sample of developing countries) with a new US$1.25 per capita/day international poverty line (see Table 1 ). At the outset one should note that the US$1.25/day level and its precursors have faced considerable criticism for a range of reasons (see Fischer 2010) . We use the US$1.25 level in this paper because, for better or worse, it is MDG 1a and we compare the findings we generate with the global poverty distribution generated with MDG 1b (nutrition), MDG 2 (education) and the new Multi-dimensional Poverty measure. Chen and Ravallion (2004; 2007; 2008) Notes: PPP = purchasing power parity; WDR = World Development Report; ICP = International Comparison Programme; LSMS = Living Standards Measurement Programme. Chen and Ravallion (2008) estimated that in 2005 1.38bn people lived below the new international poverty line of US$1.25/day and that this number fell by 400mn between 1990 and 2005 from 1.81bn in 1990. Consequently, the distribution of the global poor shifted. In 1990, China accounted for 40 per cent of the global poor, whereas in 2005, the poor mainly lived in India (1/3) and sub-Saharan Africa (1/3) (see Figure 1) . And while the percentage of people living in poverty has drastically fallen in China, poverty has risen in absolute numbers in India and sub-Saharan Africa since 1990. Source: Chen and Ravallion (2008: 44) 2 Klasen (2010) , amongst others, has noted that these results likely overestimate poverty rates in China and India because they are driven in part by the recalculation of the 2005 PPP data. 3 However, the recent Ravallion and Chen (March 2010) estimate for the impact of the economic crisis on MDG 1 at US$1.25/day was to add 65 million more poor people in . The World Bank (2010 estimates are that if recovery from the current economic recession is rapid there will be an estimated 918mn poor people in 2015. If recovery is weak there will be 1.132bn poor people in 2015.
In either case about 40 per cent of the world's poor will live in sub-Saharan African.
In contrast, the new UNDP Human Development Report 2010 Multi-dimensional Poverty Index (MPI) of Alkire and Santos (2010) argues that, if you take a multidimensional approach (an index of ten indicators of social development) and consider 104 countries that have data (or 78 per cent of the world's population), there are 1.7bn poor people. Of these, 51 per cent live in South Asia; 28 per cent in sub-Saharan Africa; 15 per cent in East Asia and the Pacific; 3 per cent in Latin America and the Caribbean; 1 per cent in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and 2 per cent in the Arab states (see Figure 2) . In some countries, the MPI is considerably higher than the US$1.25 headcount and in other countries the opposite is true. Further, Alkire and Santos (2010: 32) note that South Asia has almost twice the number of poor people as Africa (the next poorest region) and 8 states in India have as many poor people (421mn) as the 26 poorest African countries (410mn).
One final estimate of the global distribution of the world's poor is that of McKay and Baulch (2004) who sought to estimate the global number and distribution of the world's chronic poor (those in dollar-a-day poverty for more than 5 years). Their estimate of 300-420mn chronic poor people in the late 1990s suggested that they mainly live in South Asia (44 per cent) and sub-Saharan Africa (29 per cent). However, these estimates are based on extrapolation from a small number of countries that have data on chronic poverty. The above estimates are useful in describing the global distribution of the poor by region. It is also possible to estimate the global distribution of the poor by country types or classifications such as low/middle income and fragile and conflict-affected states. This is the contribution of this paper.
COUNTRY CLASSIFICATIONS
There are several ways to classify countries. For example: UNDP's low, medium and high human development based on income per capita, education and health criteria in the Human Development Index; UNCTAD's Least Developed Countries (LDC), based on three components: gross national income (GNI) per capita; indicators for human assets (including nutrition, child mortality, school enrolment, adult literacy); and an economic vulnerability indicator (including measures of the instability of agricultural production, population displaced by natural disasters, instability in exports, the share of agriculture in GDP and exports and proxies for economic 'smallness' (less than 75mn people) and 'remoteness'; IMF's World Economic Outlook (WEO) Emerging and Developing Countries list which is based on criteria that are not consistent over time (see discussion in WEO Statistical Annex).
However, in this paper we have chosen to use the low/middle income classifications of the World Bank and the various classifications of fragile and conflict-affected states (FCAS) because these are two of the most widely utilised country classifications. As we note, both have important limitations (see discussion in text and Annex I). We do present, in each table, estimates for the Least Developed Countries.
LICS AND MICS
The World Bank's classifications of low-income (LIC), lower middle-income (LMIC), upper middle-income (UMIC) and high-income (HIC) countries are based on GNI per capita classifications (see Table 2 ). These classifications are based on the Bank's operational lending categories (civil works preferences, IDA eligibility, etc.) and thus seek to give better conditions to poorer countries based on economic capacity measured by GNI per capita. The thresholds are recalibrated annually in the light of international inflation (measured as the average inflation of Japan, the UK, the US and the Euro Zone). These measures classify all 186 World Bank member countries and other economies with populations of more than 30,000 (210 countries in total). The thresholds are constant in real terms (if one assumes international inflation rates for the world's richest countries are appropriate for the world's poorest countries -which generally have higher inflation rates). The actual basis of the original thresholds is complex (see Annex I). After rising considerably in the 1990s, the total number of LICs has fallen considerably since 2000. Over the last decade the number of LICs has fallen from around 60 to just 39 in the most recent data released on 1 July 2010 for FY2011 (see Table 3 ). This, of course, has immediate consequences for global poverty distributions. Of the total of 27 countries achieving MIC status since 2000, six were 'transition' countries (perhaps returning to historical economic capacities) and several were small islands. However, the most notable for the global distribution of poverty is the reclassification of some very populous countries such as India, Nigeria and Pakistan (China had already graduated in 1999). Of this list, only two countries Côte d'Ivoire and Pakistan were very close to the threshold, and Pakistan (which was technically under the LMIC threshold by US$20) has a significant impact on the global poverty distribution. One could also note that India is only US$45 per capita over the threshold, but a reasonable assumption is that growth in India will continue and India is not in danger of slipping back. We take up the 'special cases' of India and China later in the discussion. We note here just four countries (India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Nigeria) account for much of the total number of poor that have 'moved' to MIC countries.
In recently released data (1 July 2010), five more countries have graduated and one country fell back to LIC status (see Table 4 ). Data on these countries' GNI per capita have not yet been added to the WDI so it is not yet easily possible to see how close to the LIC/IDA thresholds they are with comparable consistent GNI atlas method data. (For this reason and because we are seeking to keep some reasonable consistency between data years for comparability, we use FY2010 data which are based on the data year 2008 to estimate the subsequent global distribution of poverty because we use poverty data from the most recent available year which is 2007 or 2008.) It is worth noting that at least ten (we do not yet have comparable GNI atlas data for the five new MICs noted above in WDI) of the 27 new MICs actually fall under the IDA allocation threshold of US$1,135 per capita and have been referred to as 'blend' countries by the World Bank (in that they are MICs and thus IBRD-eligible but also under the IDA allocation threshold). These are countries that are officially MICs but only just qualify for IDA and in most cases it is a question of only just (see Table 5 ). This group of ten countries does include India and Pakistan and thus 497mn poor people.
We can then assess where the poor live (see Section 4 below for fuller details and for quick reference see Tables 4 6 below). 
FCAS AND NON-FCAS
In addition to the LIC/MIC/IDA classifications there are also the Fragile and Conflictaffected State (FCAS) classifications. Paul Collier (2007: 3) has popularised the idea of the need to focus on the 'bottom billion' -the total population, not the poor population who live in 60 or so countries 'falling behind and often falling apart '. 5 It is true that fragile states are more off-track on the MDGs than other types of developing countries (UNDP 2009). In 2010 the WDR will present data showing that much of the 'off-trackness' of MDGs is accounted for by FCAS. However, when it comes to finding the poor, the picture is a bit more complicated. Fragile states are significant to global poverty, but so are populous developing countries. An alternative definition of FCAS would differentiate on the basis of the extent of fragility. The quickest (and crudest) way to produce this would be a 'wisdom of crowds approach' and thus:
higher fragility = country on all three lists (N = 17); low or medium fragility = country on one or more list (N = 26); 5 Collier's focus on the poorest countries -LICs and 'fragile states' has been acted upon by a number of donors such as DFID and the World Bank, for example in terms of priorities chosen and programmes funded. Take for one example, the UK DFID's (2009: 71,129) White Paper, which allocated half of all new bilateral country funding to fragile states and noted the closing down of nine country offices between 2007 and 2010, thus echoing Collier that development agencies should stop aid to countries on a path to sustained growth and focus on the core problem of the bottom billion. 6 For example, The Lancet estimated just six countries account for 50 per cent of under-5 mortality (U5M) (over 5 million children). These are a mix of fragile and non-fragile populous countries: India, Nigeria, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Pakistan and China (and 42 countries account for 90 per cent of U5M - Bryce et al., 2005) . Similarly, maternal deaths are concentrated in 11 countries, which account for 65 per cent of all maternal deaths (348,400 women). Again, many are fragile states but some are not: India, Nigeria, DRC, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Pakistan, Niger, Tanzania and Angola (WHO/UNICEF/UNFPA/World Bank, 2007). Both sets of estimates were recently and contentiously revised (see Hogan et al. 2010; You et al. 2010) . 7 When Harttgen and Klasen (2010) assessed the usefulness of the concept of 'fragility' and how lists differ, they concluded that the heterogeneity of countries under various FCAS classifications is so great it is not useful to treat them as a group as the problems they face and the solutions differ greatly.
This raises a question mark over the oft-cited figure that a third of the world's poor live in fragile states. Does it refer to one list, 17 or 43 countries? The mathematical basis of this figure is somewhat of a mystery (the author has asked a number of relevant academics and policy people).
We can then estimate how many poor people live in FCAS by various definitions (see Section 4 below for full details and for quick reference see Tables 7 and 8 ). If we take the FCAS common to all lists we get just 6 per cent of the world's poor. The Brookings and Carleton lists produce a count of 19-21 per cent of the world's poor living in FCAS. In contrast, the World Bank list produces a much lower count at 10 per cent with more countries because it does not include populous Ethiopia and Nigeria. The aggregated list of OECD (2010) produces a count of 23 per cent of the world's poor living in FCAS. It should be noted that three populous FCAS (countries with >20mn population) (by various lists) are missing poverty data and, taken together, have a population of 101mn (Afghanistan, Iraq and Sudan). It is also worth noting that just 6 of the FCAS with data account for a large proportion -16 per centof the world's poor. These are DRC, Ethiopia, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan and Uganda. In short, most of the poor in FCAS live in just 6 countries or so (one might add Afghanistan, Iraq and Sudan). 
THE GLOBAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE WORLD'S POOR
We have noted estimates so far of the global distribution of the world's poor by LICs/MICs and FCAS. These were produced by taking the most recent US$1.25 poverty data (2007-8 or nearest year) and corresponding population data for the year of poverty estimate from the World Development Indicators. The purpose of this is neither a precise global poverty estimate nor a precise estimate of the distribution of the world's poor. It is merely to argue that the poverty 'problem' has changed radically. The large majority of the world's absolute poor -almost a billion peoplelive in stable MICs (many of which have substantial domestic resources). This raises all sorts of questions about the future of poverty reduction, aid and development policy.
If we take a global perspective, the available data generate a total world poverty headcount for countries with data in 2007-8 of 1.327bn (see Annex II for available country poverty estimates), which is somewhat similar to Chen and Ravallion's estimate of a global poor headcount of 1.38bn for 2005. There are important caveats to this somewhat crude methodology (see below) and the absolute numbers should be taken with particular caution due to missing data for a number of countries and differing data years. Data for 1990 should be treated with particular caution. We feel what is robust enough for the sake of this paper is the distribution of the world's poor in 2007-8.
For 2007-8 we can have greater confidence in estimates of the global distribution of the world's poor because we have data for 67/101 MICs, 36/43 LICs and 29/43 fragile states listed in WDI and in total these data account for 80 per cent of the world's population in 2007. Most of the countries without data are countries with relatively small populations and whose absence will not make a substantial difference to our global estimates. There are, however, three populous countries (>20mn people) missing data as previously noted -Afghanistan (popn, 2007: 29mn); Iraq (popn, 2007: 31mn) and Sudan (popn, 2007: 41mn) .
These preliminary estimates suggest, as noted, that most of the world's poor -around a billion people -no longer live in LICs (see Tables 9 and 10 and figure 5 ). Of course, this largely reflects the fact that some large LICs have transitioned to MICs.
The data suggest that 72 per cent of the world's poor live in MICs and 61 per cent of the world's poor live in stable MICs. LICs account for just 28 per cent of the world's poor and fragile LICs account for just 12 per cent. Contrary to earlier estimates that a third of the poor live in fragile states, our 'ball-park' estimate is about 23 per cent and they are split fairly evenly between fragile LICs and fragile MICs.
8 In contrast, in 1988 In contrast, in -1990 , with a more limited dataset and thus some caution, we estimate that 93 per cent of the world's poor lived in LICs and just 7 per cent in MICs.
What happens when China and India are removed? Over the last 20 years the proportion of the world's poor accounted for by China and India has fallen from two-thirds to a half. The percentage of global poverty in the MICs (minus China and India) has risen from 7 to 22 per cent (much of this is focused in Indonesia, Nigeria and Pakistan). The percentage of global poverty in the LICs (minus China and India) has fallen from 31 per cent to 28 per cent. How much difference does it make if we use other poverty measures? What is perhaps surprising is that -with the exception of children out of school -there is surprisingly little difference between different poverty measures and the global poverty distributions generated (see Table 11 and Figures 5 and 6 In contrast, estimates of child malnutrition are 112mn (WHO 2009: 10) . Our WDI data generate a count of 128-188mn malnourished children by height-for-age and weight-for-age respectively (see Table 13 ). Data are available for China and India for 2007-8 but not for 1990. They suggest that in 2007-8 China and India accounted for 43-48 per cent of the world's malnourished children. These nutrition data follow the pattern similar to that of the US$1.25 data for LICs/MICs/FCAS. Finally, the UNDP multi-dimensional poverty index data also follow the pattern of the US$1.25 data in terms of the global distribution of the world's poor by LICs/MICs/FCAS (see Table  14 ). What these data do is raise various questions for further exploration. We conclude and discuss future research avenues. The number of children of primary school age out of school in 1990 is estimated using WDI data on % net primary school enrolment and an estimation of primary school age population using data from UNESCO and from the WDI. So, those values are not historical data, but estimates. Least Developed Countries = same group of 50 used in both time points although Cape Verde graduated in 2006 and some of these LDCs are now MICs. 
CONCLUSIONS AND POTENTIAL POLICY IMPLICATIONS
GLOBAL POVERTY ESTIMATES
The data presented in this paper should be seen as preliminary estimates. Clearly, the first part of any research agenda is to further probe the data and the shifting global distribution of poverty (see below). As emphasised, it should be recognised that this is an inherently imprecise exercise but it is posited here that the general pattern is robust enough to warrant further investigation and discussion. Indeed, the results raise all sorts of questions.
First, there is a new 'bottom billion' who are living in the MICs: most of the world's poor -three-quarters, or almost one billion poor people -now live in MICs. Indeed, about two-thirds of the world's poor live in stable MICs. This is not just about India and China as the percentage of global poverty accounted for by the MICs minus China and India has risen considerably from 7 per cent to 22 per cent.
Second, the remaining 39 LICs account for just a quarter of the world's poor and fragile LICs account for just 12 per cent of the world's poor.
Of course there are caveats to the above on methodological grounds. We note here just four countries (India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Nigeria) account for much of the total number of poor that have 'moved' to MIC countries. More importantly, is the above an artefact of methodology in itself? How meaningful are country classifications?
The headlines do though raise questions not only about the definitions of country categories; but also about the future of poverty reduction in heterogeneous contexts; about the role of inequality and structural societal change; and about aid and development policy. One read of the data is that poverty is increasingly turning from an international to a national distribution problem, and that governance and domestic taxation and redistribution policies become of more importance than ODA.
Further, one should register some caution on the above headlines. We could equally say that the share of poor living in Africa more than doubled.
The headlines do though raise questions about the definitions of country categories; about the future of poverty reduction in heterogeneous contexts; about the role of inequality and structural societal change; and about aid and development policy. One read of the data is that poverty is increasingly turning from an international to a national distribution problem, and that governance and domestic taxation and redistribution policies become of more importance than ODA. 
A FUTURE RESEARCH AGENDA
Revisiting and rethinking the country classifications and definitions
The future of poverty reduction -understanding poverty reduction in heterogeneous contexts; the role of inequality and structural societal change
There are particularly important new research avenues to be explored in comparative poverty heterogeneity. How do the extent, nature and causes of poverty differ between countries? (And thus how might policy responses differ?) Why is poverty still high in MICs? Is a focus on inequality more important than a focus on immediate poverty reduction? What about demographics? What is happening to the labour force? Why has growth led to MICs with high poverty and little societal change? Does educational poverty really differ from monetary and nutritional poverty in terms of LIC/MIC distribution and if so why? Such issues might fruitfully be explored in the 27 new MICs, comparing to older MICs and to the remaining 39 LICs. Growth without social, economic, or political transformation might begin to explain the continuing levels of absolute poverty in the MICs. When one takes an initial look at the new MICs (Table 15 and Annex III) some change in employment in agriculture is evident but surprisingly little change in inequality and tax revenue. In the 27 new MICs there has however been a radical increase in forex reserves and an equally radical fall in aid as a percentage of gross capital formation. Certainly, if we go further and take some of the largest and longer-standing MICs, aid is insignificant and has been for sometime and forex reserves are large (see Table 16 ). This needs more exploration with a range of indicators of course and greater investigation into why countries are achieving MIC status with relatively little, if any, transformation. This also raises issues of short-run and long-run development. The goal of development for the last 20 years has largely been growth-led poverty reduction. Barder has suggested this objective needs revisiting because the emphasis on the one goal -poverty reduction defined as a permanent reduction in the global poverty headcount through economic growth -has contributed both to poor programme selection and poor programme design and implementation, and it has thereby undermined the effectiveness of aid (Barder 2009: 2) Further, a new agenda should, not target a single measure of poverty reduction but explicitly manage a portfolio of objectives that (a) promote long-term and permanent changes in developing countries by investing resources and sharing knowledge; (b) tackle the causes of poverty by changing the policies of rich countries and investing in global public goods; (c) transfer income and consumption from the world's rich to the world's poor to enable them to live better lives while development is taking place, as a matter of global social justice; and (d) target more assistance on those in chronic and deep poverty (Barder 2009: 2) This resonates with other calls for a new approach to development objectives:
The objective, through economic development and statebuilding, is transformation of developing countries into middle class societies in which citizens hold their governments accountable for provision of physical security and basic social services… A good indicator of progress in transformation is a growing middle class that has the economic heft and consequent political voice to hold government accountable for the domestic social contract. (Birdsall 2009: 2) This might mean that long-term poverty reduction requires more focus on structural economic transformation (assessed perhaps by the percentage of employment in agriculture) or a social transformation to a low level of inequality (assessed by gini coefficient and implied emergence of a middle/consuming class), or political transformation (assessed by tax revenue as percentage of GDP and the implied accountability that follows).
The future of aid -rethinking the future of aid and aid effectiveness
Finally, aid needs some rethinking. Aid and 'aid effectiveness' in particular are going through a major rethink already (see detailed discussion in Evans 2010). There is the transparency and accountability revolution (see Barder 2009), and there are much broader and deeper changes afoot. There is further a questioning of whether aid effectiveness debates have missed the point by focusing on quantity or quality of aid (Fischer 2010) and even suggestions that traditional ODA is dead (Severino and Ray 2009; . In sum, if most of the world's poor live in MICs there is a considerable research agenda required to address the implications of this for research and policy for global poverty reduction.
ANNEX I: COUNTRY CLASSIFICATIONS
WORLD BANK LIC/MIC CLASSIFICATIONS
The short history on the web of the Bank's classifications notes that the thresholds were established by finding a stable relationship between a summary measure of well-being such as poverty incidence and infant mortality on the one hand and economic variables including per capita GNI estimated based on the Bank's Atlas method on the other. Based on such a relationship and the annual availability of Bank's resources, the original per capita income thresholds were established.
9
The World Bank's Operational Manual (2010, Annex D: 7) notes 'countries are eligible for IDA on the basis of (a) relative poverty and (b) lack of creditworthiness... To receive IDA resources, countries must also meet tests of performance'.
10
The World Bank's Public Information Centre notes in personal correspondence that, there is no official document that we can find that ever specified an exact formula for setting the original income thresholds… When IDA was established in 1960, member countries were classified as Part 1 or Part 2 countries, based more on a general understanding and agreement by the executive directors of each country rather than strict income guidelinesthough, for the most part, the classifications were in line with per capita income levels. [Part 1 countries were more developed countries that were expected to contribute financially to IDA; and Part 2 countries were less developed countries of which only a subset could be expected to draw on IDA's concessional resources.] When the operational guidelines were established in the 1970s, the thresholds were based on cross-country analysis that looked at various other indicators besides per capita income, such as the manufacturing sector's contribution to GDP, export growth, infant mortality, nutrition, and the education standard reached. While it was recognized that per capita income did not, by itself, constitute or measure welfare or success in development, countries at various income levels, taken as a group, did exhibit similar characteristics for these other indicators that were studied. The thresholds are those formalized in FY77.
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The current FY 2010 thresholds are:
Low-income countries are those with GNI per capita less than $995 and this tallies with the Bank's operational 'civil works preference' lending category (civil works can be awarded to eligible domestic contractors for bids procured under an international competitive bidding process). Lower-middle income status is currently $996-3945 per capita.
IDA eligibility and IDA allocation are an additional layer of complexity because the World Bank has resource constraints. IDA loans are interest-free loans and grants (i.e. deeply concessional -in contrast to IBRD loans which are non-concessional) and based on the Bank's IDA allocation threshold or ability to lend since FY1994. The IDA eligibility threshold (the ceiling for eligibility) is up to $1,905 per capita based on a historical formula that is no longer applied because of insufficient resources. Instead there is the IDA allocation threshold (the actual or effective operational cutoff for IDA eligibility), which is $1,165 per capita. Effectively, there is one historic formula to determine need for IDA (the IDA eligibility threshold) and another formula since 1994 to determine what the IDA is able to deliver (the IDA allocation threshold) based on World Bank resources.
In sum, countries with GNI per capita below the 'civil works preference' are LICs. Then it gets more complex. Countries whose GNI per capita is higher than the 'civil works preference' but lower than the threshold for 17-year IBRD loans are LMICs. Countries whose GNI per capita is higher than the operational threshold for 17-year IBRD loans are UMICs (although this is only as the LMIC/UMIC threshold because the IBRD categories were streamlined and the 17-year operational threshold was eliminated in 2008). Further, an explicit benchmark of $6,000 per capita (1987 prices) was established in 1989 to differentiate between MICs and HICs. 
COUNTRY CLASSIFICATIONS -FCAS
